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GOETHE ON EVOLUTION.*
BV PROF. ERNST HAECKEL.
The majorit)' of us, I am sure, appreciate Goethe
as a poet and a man only ; there are but few who have
an idea of the great value of his work done in the nat-
ural sciences, and of the gigantic progress with which
he overtook his own age, so that most naturalists of
that time were unable to keep abreast with him.
His scientific performances were not recognized by
his contemporaries, and Goethe painfully felt the
slight. In several passages of his scientific writings
he complains bitterly of the narrow-mindedness of
professional naturalists, who did not know how to ap-
preciate his labors and who, roaming among the
trees, search in vain after the forest, not being able
to rise above the confused mass of single details in
order to recognize the general laws of nature. Goethe's
reproach is justified : " The philosopher will soon dis-
cover that there are but few observers that rise to a
standpoint from which they can survey so many im-
portantly related objects."
Yet it is true at the same time that this want of
recognition was caused through the errors into which
Goethe was led by his theory of colors. This theory
of colors, which he himself designates as the favorite
production of his leisure, however much that is beauti-
ful it may contain, is a complete failure with regard to
its foundations. The exact mathematical method by
means of which alone it is possible, in inorganic sci-
ences, but above all in physics, to raise a structure
step by step on a thoroughly firm basis, was altogether
repugnant to Goethe. In rejecting it he allowed him-
self not only to be very unjust towards the most emi-
nent physicists, but to be led into errors which have
greatly injured the fame of his other valuable works.
It is quite different in the organic sciences, in
which we are but rarely able to proceed, from the be-
ginning, upon a firm mathematical basis ; we are
rather compelled, by the infinitely difficult and intri-
cate nature of the problem, at the first to form induc-
tions—that is, we are obliged to endeavor to estab-
lish general laws by numerous individual observations,
which are not quite complete. A thoughtful compar-
ison of kindred groups of phenomena, or the method
Translated from the NatUrlicke Schopfungsgeschichte Chapter IV, Eight
Edition, jSSg.
of combination, is here the most important instru-
ment for inquiry, and this method was applied by
Goethe in his scientific investigation with as much
success as with conscious knowledge of its import-
ance.
The most celebrated among Goethe's writings con-
cerning organic nature is his Metamorphosis of Plants,
which appeared in 1790, a work which distinctly shows
a grasp of the fundamental idea of the theory of evo-
lution. Goethe attempted to point out a single fun-
damental organ, by the infinitely varied development
and metamorphosis of which the whole of the end-
less variety of forms in the world of plants might be
conceived to have arisen ; this fundamental organ he
found in the leaf.
If at that time the microscope had been generally
employed, if Goethe had examined the structure of
organisms by the means of the microscope, he would
have gone still further, and would have seen that the
leaf is itself a compound of individual parts of- a lower
order, that is, of cells. He would then not have de-
clared that the leaf, but that the cell is the real funda-
mental organ by the multiplication, transformation,
and combination (synthesis) of which, in the first
place, the leaf is formed ; and that, in the next place,
by transformation, variation, and combination of
leaves there arise all the varied beauties in form and
color which we admire in the green parts, as well as
in the organs of propagation, or the flowers of plants.
Goethe here showed that in order to comprehend the
whole of the phenomenon, we must in the first place
institute comparisons and, secondly, search for a sim-
ple type, a simple original form, of which all other
forms are only so many variations.
Something similar to that which he had here done
with regard to the metamorphosis of plants he then
did for the Vertebrate animals, in his celebrated ver-
tebral theory of the skull. Goethe was the first to
show, independently of Oken, who almost simultane-
ously arrived at the same thought, that the skull of
man and of all Vertebrate animals, in particular mam-
mals, is nothing more than a bony case, formed of the
same bones,—that is, of the foremost vertebrae,—out
of which the spine also is composed. The vertebrae
of the skull were originally like those of the spine,
bony rings lying behind each other, but in the skull
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they are now peculiarly changed and specialized.
Although this idea has been greatly modified by the
ingenious discoveries of Gegenbaur, yet in Goethe's
day it was one of the greatest advances in compara-
tive anatomy, and was not only one of the first
advances towards the understanding of the structure
of Vertebrate animals, but at the same time explained
many individual phenomena. When two parts of a
body, such as the skull and spine, which appear at
first sight so different, were proved to be par^s origi-
nally the same, developed out of one and the same
foundation, one of the most difficult problems was
solved. Here again we meet the notion of a single
type—the conception of a single principle, which be-
comes infinitely varied in the different species, and in
the parts of individual species.
But Goethe did not merely endeavor to search
for such far-reaching laws, he also occupied himself
most actively for a long time with numerous spe-
cial researches, particularly in comparative anatomy.
Among these, none is perhaps more interesting than
his discovery of the mid jawbone in man. As this is,
in several respects, of importance to the theory of ev-
olution, I shall briefly explain it.
There exist in all mammals two little bones in the
upper jaw, which meet in the centre of the face, be-
low the nose, and which lie in the middle of the upper
jawbone proper. These two bones, which hold the four
upper cutting teeth, are recognized without difficulty in
most mammals ; in man, however, they were at that
time unknown, and celebrated comparative anatomists
even laid great stress upon this want of a mid jaw-
bone, as they considered it to constitute the principal
difference between man and ape. The want of a mid
jawbone was, curiously enough, looked upon as the
most human of all human characteristics.
Goethe could not accept the notion that man who,
bodily considered, in all other respects was clearly a
mammal of higher development, should lack this mid
jawbone. By the general law of induction as to the
mid jawbone he arrived at the special deductive con-
clusion that it must exist in man also, and Goethe did
not rest satisfied until, after comparing a great num-
ber of human skulls, he really found the mid jawbone.
In some individuals it is preserved throughout a whole
lifetime, but usually at an early age it coalesces with
the neighboring upper jawbone, and is therefore only
to be found as an independent bone in very youthful
skulls. In human embryos it can now easily be
pointed out. In man, the mid jawbone actually ex-
ists, and to Goethe the honor is due of having first
firmly established this fact, so important in many re-
spects. This he did while opposed by the celebrated
anatomist, Peter Camper, one of the highest profes-
sional authorities.
The way by which Goethe succeeded in estab-
lishing this fact is especially interesting ; it is the way
by which we continually advance in biological science,
namely, by way of induction and deduction. Induc-
tion is the inference of a general law from the obser-
vation of numerous individual cases ; deduction, on the
other hand, is an inference from this general law ap-
plied to a single case which has not yet been actuall}^
observed. From the collected empirical knowledge of
those days, the inductive conclusion was arrived at
that all mammals had mid jawbones. Goethe drew
from this the deductive conclusion, that man, whose
organization was in all other respects not essentially
different from mammals, must also possess this mid
jawbone; and on close examination it was actually
found. The deductive conclusion was confirmed and
verified by experience.
Even these few remarks may serve to show the
great value which we must ascribe to Goethe's biolog-
ical researches. Unfortunately most of his labors de-
voted to this subject are so hidden in his collected
works, and the most important observations and re-
marks so scattered in his numerous various treatises
—devoted to other subjects—that it is difficult to find
them out. It also sometimes happens that an excel-
lent, truly scientific remark is so much interwoven
with a mass of useless speculation, that the latter
greatly detract from the former.
Nothing is perhaps more characteristic of the ex-
traordinary interest which Goethe took in the investi-
gation of organic nature than the vivid interest with
which, even in his last years, he followed the dispute
which broke out in France between Cuvier and
Geoffroy de St. Hilaire. Goethe, in a special treatise
which was only finished a few days before his death,
in March, 1832, has given an interesting account of
this remarkable dispute and its general importance,
as well as an excellent description of the two great
opponents. This treatise bears the title Principes
de Philosophie Zoologique par M. Geoffroy de Saint
Hilaire ; it is Goethe's last work, and forms the con-
clusion in the edition of his collected works.
The dispute itself was, in several respects, of the
highest interest. It turned essentially upon the jus-
tification of the theory of evolution. It was carried
on, moreover, in the bosom of the French Academj',
by both opponents, with a personal vehemence almost
unheard of in the dignified sessions of that learned
body. This proved that both naturalists were fight-
ing for their most sacred and deepest convictions.
The first conflict began on the 22nd of February, 1830,
and was followed by several others ; the fiercest combat
took place on the 19th of July, 1830. Geoffroy, as the
chief of the French nature-philosophers, represented
the theory of natural development and the monistic
THE OPEN COURT. 211-^
conception of nature. He maintained the mutability
of organic species, the common descent of the indi-
vidual species from common primary forms, and the
unity of their organization—or the unity of the plan
of structure, as it was then called. Cuvier was the
most decided opponent of these views. He endeav-
ored to .show that the nature-philosopher had no right
to arrive at such comprehensive conclusions on the
basis of the empirical knowledge then possessed, and
that the unity of organization—or plan of structure of
organisms—as maintained by them, did not exist.
He represented the teleological (dualistic) conception
of nature, and maintained that "the immutability of
species was a necessary condition of the existence of
a scientific history of nature."
Cuvier had the great advantage over his opponent,
that he was able to bring towards the proof of his as-
sertions things obvious to the eye ; these, however,
were only individual facts taken out of their connec-
tion with others. Geoffroy was not able to prove the
higher and general connection of individual phenom-
ena which he maintained, by equall}' tangible details.
Hence Cuvier, in the eyes of the majority, gained the
victory, and decided the defeat of the nature-philoso-
phy and the supremacy of the strictly empiric ten-
dency for the next thirty years.
Goethe of course supported Geoffroy's views. How
deeply interested he was, even in his Sistyear, in this
great contest is proved by the following anecdote re-
lated by Soret :
—
"Monday, Aug. and, 1830.—The news of the out-
break of the July revolution arrived in Weimar to-
day, and caused great excitement. In the course of
the afternoon I went to Goethe. ' Well ? ' he ex-
claimed as I entered, 'what do you think of this great
event ? The volcano has burst forth, all is in flames,
and there are no more negotiations behind closed
doors.' 'A dreadful affair,' I answered; ' but what
else could be expected under the circumstances, and
with such a ministrj', except that it would end in the
expulsion of the present royal family ! ' 'We do not
seem to understand each other, my dear friend,' re-
plied Goethe. ' I am not speaking of those people at
all ; I am interested in something very different, I
mean the dispute between Cuvier and Geoffroy de
Saint Hilaire, which has broken out in the Academy,
and which is of such great importance to science.'
This remark of Goethe's came upon me so unexpect-
edly, that I did not know what to say, and my
thoughts for some minutes seemed to have come to a
complete standstill. 'The affair is of the utmost im-
portance,' he continued, 'and you cannot form any
idea of what I felt on receiving the news of the meet-
ing on the igth. In Geoffroy de Saint Hilaire we
have now a mighty ally for a long time to come. But
I also see how great the sympathy of the French sci-
entific world must be in this affair, for, in spite of the
terrible political excitement, the meeting on the 19th
was attended by a full house. The best of it is, how-
ever, that the synthetic treatment of nature, intro-
duced into France by Geoffroy, can now no longer be
stopped. This matter has now become public through
the discussions in the Academy, carried on in the
presence of a large audience ; it can no longer be re-
ferred to secret committees, or be settled or sup-
pressed behind closed doors.'
"
In my work on "The General Morphology of Or-
ganisms " I have placed as headings to the different
books and chapters a selection of the numerous inter-
esting and important sentences in which Goethe
clearly expresses his view of organic nature and its
constant development. 1 will here quote a passage
from the poem entitled, "The Metamorphosis of Ani-
mals " (1819)
:
" Members develop themselves according to laws universal
;
Even the form that is strange preserveth in secret the image
of its original type. 'Tis the animal's shape that conditions
Habits of life ; and the habits again will potently model
Every different form. There is order in growth, that is steady
Yet it will change in accordance with causes externally acting." *
Here, clearly enough, the contrast is indicated be-
tween the two different forces that form organisms.
They are opposed to one another, and by their inter-
action determine the shape of the organism. On the
one hand, a common inner original type, firmly main-
taining itself, constitutes the foundation of the most
different forms; on the other hand, the externally
active influence of surroundings and habits of life,
which influence the original type and transform it.
The same contrast is still more definitely pointed
out in the following passage: "An inner original
community forms the foundation of all organization ;
the variety of forms, on the other hand, arises from
the necessary relations to the outer world, and we
may therefore justly assume an original difference of
conditions, together with an uninterruptedly pro-
gressive transformation, in order to be able to com-
prehend the constancy as well as the variations of the
phenomena of form."
The " original type " which constitutes the foun-
dation of every organic form "as the inner original
community" is the inner constructive force, which re-
ceives the original direction of form-production—that
is, the tendency to give rise to a particular form—and
is propagated by Inheritance. The "uninterruptedly
progressive transformation," on the other hand, which
"springs from the necessary relations to the outer
* Alle Glieder bilden sich aus nach ew'gen Gesetzen,
Und die seltenste Form bewahrt im Geheimniss das Urbild.
Also bestimmt die Gestalt die Lebensweise des Thieres,
Und die Weise zu leben, sie wirkt aut alle Gestalten
Machtig zuruck. So zeiget sich fest die geordnete Bildung,
Welche zum Wechsel sich neigt durch ausserlich wirkende Wesen.
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world," acting as an external formative force, pro-
duces, by Adaptation to the surrounding conditions of
life, the "infinite variety of forms."
The internal formative tendency of Inheritance,
which retains the unity of the original type, is called
by Goethe in another passage the centripetal force of
the organism, or its tendency to specification. In
contrast with this he calls the external formative ten-
dency of Adaptation, which produces the variety of
organic forms, the centrifugal force of organisms, or
their tendency to variation. The passage in which he
clearly indicates the " equilibrium " of these two ex-
tremely important organic formative tendencies, runs
as follows : ' ' The idea of metamorphosis resembles the
vis ceiitrifuga, and would lose itself in the infinite, if
a counterpoise were not added to it : I mean the ten-
'dency to specification, the strong power to preserve
what once has come into being, a vis ce'ntripeta
which in its deepest foundation cannot be affected by
anything external."
Metamorphosis, according to Goethe, consists not
merely, as the word is now generally understood, in
the changes of form which the organic individual ex-
periences during its individual development, but in a
wider sense, in the transformation of organic forms in
general. His idea of metamorphosis is almost synony-
mous with the theory of evolution. This is clear,
among other things, from the following passage :
" The triumph of physiological metamorphosis mani-
fests itself where the whole separates and transforms
itself into families, the families into genera, the gen-
era into species, and then again into other varieties
down to the individual. This operation of nature
goes on ad infinitum ; she cannot rest inactive, but
neither can she keep and preserve all that she has
produced. From seeds there are always developed
varying plants, exhibiting the relations of their parts
to one another in an altered manner."
Goethe had, in truth, discovered the two great
mechanical forces of nature, which are the active
causes of organic formations, his two organic forma-
tive tendencies—on the one hand the conservative,
centripetal, and internal formative tendency of Inher-
itance or specification ; and on the other hand the pro-
gressive, centrifugal, and external formative tendency
of Adaptation, or metamorphosis. This profound
biological intuition could not but lead him naturally
to the fundamental idea of the Doctrine of Filiation,
that is, to the conception that the organic species re-
sembling one another in form are actually related by
blood, and that they are descended from a common
original type. In regard to the most important of all
animal groups, namely that of Vertebrate animals,
Goethe expresses this doctrine in the following pas-
sage (1796) : "Thus much then we have gained, that
we may assert without hesitation that all the more
perfect organic natures, such as fishes, amphibious
animals, birds, mammals, and man at the head of the
last, were all formed of one original type, which only
varies more or less in parts which are none the less
permanent, and still daily changes and modifies its
form by propagation."
This sentence is of interest in more than one way.
The theory that all " the more perfect organic na-
tures," that is all Vertebrate animals, are descended
from one common prototype, that they have arisen
from it by propagation (Inheritance) and transforma-
tion (Adaptation), may be distinctly inferred. But it
is especially interesting to observe that Goethe admits
no exceptional position for man, but rather expressly
includes him in the tribe of the other Vertebrate ani-
mals. The most important special inference of the
Doctrine of Filiation, that man is descended from
other Vertebrate animals, may here be recognized in
the germ.
This exceedingly important fundamental idea is
expressed by Goethe still more clearly in another pas-
sage (1807), in the following words : " If we con-
sider plants and animals in their most imperfect con-
dition, they can scarcely be distinguished. But this
much we can say, that the creatures which by degrees
emerge as plants and animals out of a common phase,
where they are barely distinguishable, arrive at per-
fection in two opposite directions ; so that the plant
in the end reaches its highest glory in the tree, which
is immovable and stiff, the animal in man, who pos-
sesses the greatest elasticity and freedom." This re-
markable passage not only indicates most explicitly
the genealogical relationship between the vegetable
and animal kingdoms, but contains the germ of the
monophyletic hypothesis of descent, the importance
of which it would be foreign to our purpose here to
discuss.
OFFICIAL PERQUISITES.
BY M. M. TRUMBULL.
Here is a comical bit of news just come by tele-
graph from Paris to the American press : " Buffalo
Bill feels rather chagrined at President Carnot's refusal
to accept a handsome lamp that our famous American
had made in this country for the French President at
a cost of one thousand dollars. President Carnot refused
on the ground that he accepts presents from no one."
The surprise of Buffalo Bill was greater than the
chagrin. He was dazed and bewildered when he
"struck the trail " of a great republic whose president
never condescends to take presents from anybody. In
some other great republics which he had visited it was
the habit of the presidents to set the pattern for official
mendicity by accepting the miscellaneous patronage
of gifts from everybody.
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The mistake of Buffalo Bill was easy to make. He
had noticed the European custom of subsidizing
lackeys, guides, waiters, railway servants, and such
people, so he innocently thought that the practice pre-
vailed through all the social and official grades from
the " garcons " at the caf^ up to the President of the
Republic. In Europe, anybody whose duty it is to
perform services of the humbler kind expects to receive
a gratuity, and this is called a "tip." It operates as
a vexatious tax, especially upon travelers, who are com-
pelled to submit to it by force of some unwritten law.
The habit of taking tips lowers the self-respect of the
recipients, and gives an abject and shabby appearance
to the national spirit where the habit prevails.
The artless child of the Western plains need not
be "chagrined" because the President of the French
Republic refused to accept a tip worth a thousand dol-
lars. Let Buffalo Bill remember Mark Twain's dis-
appointment and surprise at the politeness of the
Emperor of Russia, who showed a party of American
pilgrims all over his palace at St. Petersburg, and
"made no charge." Besides, there are other republics,
and other presidents in the world ; let him try them.
Perhaps amongst them all he may find one at least,
who will gladly accept his gift.
Americans who travel in Europe are properly in-
dignant at the extortion practiced on them under the
name of tips ; but a similar practice prevalent in their
own country hardly provokes their censure. In
Europe, the recipients of tips are the lowly and the
poor, who have at least the excuse of poverty for their
action ; while in this country, those recipients are the
influential and the rich, who have no excuse at all.
Nearly all our magistrates and public officials of high
rank are in the habit of taking tips.
A very good story is told of a witty American, who
having traveled for several months in Europe, during
all which time he had been the victim of the tip tariff,
was about to return home. Going on board the steamer
at Liverpool he stopped upon the gang plank and thus
addressed the crowd standing on the shore : "If there
is any man in this antiquated monarchy to whom I
have not given ' tuppence, ' let him step up and get it.
"
The irony in that is cutting, and well deserved ; but
what if some French or English tourist departing from
our shores should answer with retaliatory sarcasm !
Suppose that standing on the gang plank of a steamer
at New York he should address the Americans on shore
and say: " If there is in this young and buoyant re-
public any president, vice-president, cabinet minister,
senator, judge, governor, mayor, or alderman, who
does not accept tips from railroad companies, and
other corporations, let him step up, that I may embrace
him before I go." In that case the sardonic laugh
would be on the other side.
Recently a Chicago newspaper compiled a strange
catechism, and appointed a father confessor to examine
all the judges as to their proficiency in that catechism.
The result was a most humiliating show of moral igno
ranee. It was a revelation of the fact that nearly all
the judges of the courts are in the habit of taking tips
from railroad companies in the shape of passes, euphe-
mistically called "courtesies." Now a courtesy to a
judge, if it have any money value, is a bribe to the
full value of the "courtesy." It may be a paltry tip,
worth perhaps not more than fifty or a hundred dol-
lars a year, but to that amount it is a bribe. The
tender of a pass to a judge is to the value of it an
offer of payment in advance for judicial courtesies,
and the acceptance of the pass is in the nature of a due
bill payable to the railroad by the judge in " courtesies"
of equal value.
It is flippantly said by the defenders of judicial
tips, that no cases can be found in the reports to show
that the judges are corruptly influenced by railroad
passes or by courtesies of similar character. This
may be true in literal statement, and it is also true
that no specific act of judicial corruption was proved
against Lord Bacon at his trial. The receipt of " cour-
tesies " was proved, and he confessed that he had ac-
cepted presents from persons who had causes in his
court, but he denied that the courtesies had affected
his decisions, or corrupted him. He was met by the
obvious reply that he was corrupted the very moment
he received the gifts. Judgment was given against him,
and the greatest man of his time was disgraced forever.
No man in office, and especially in a judicial office,
can accept presents and be free. While some of his
benefactors may offer gifts from disinterested motives,
others will not, and the recipient cannot distinguish
the sordid from the unselfish giver. The presump-
tion is always against the motives of a man who offers
gifts to a stranger, or to any one to whom he is under
no obligations.
In Europe a tip is usually begged for in an abject,
humble way as a gratuity rather than a payment, but
in this country it is accepted as the ignominious per-
quisite of rank, official station, influence, or power
;
but it is a tip though it be received by senator, judge,
governor, or even by the president.
The statement that there is no judicial partiality
shown by the courts to the railroads that give passes
to the judges, is not universally true. Obviously the
"reports" will not show the sinister inspiration of the
decisions, yet suits against railroads are frequently
thwarted and delayed by the dilatory methods familiar
to the courts of law. It has become a proverb that a
railroad victim will do better to settle with the corpo-
ration on its own terms, than to prosecute a suit
against it.
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A railroad pass is not properly a "courtes}'. " It
is money. What shoemaker having causes in court
would presume to give the judge an order for shoes?
What grocer, plaintiff or defendant in a suit, would
venture to give the judge a free pass for his yearly
sugar and tea? It is true that a railroad pass transfers
no corporeal thing, but it amounts to the company's
check for the price of a ticket to any place on its road.
If the fare from Chicago to San Francisco be one
hundred dollars, a pass from one city to the other is a
check for that amount.
Here we are met by the well known defiance, What
are you going to do about it? Nothing ! The vice of
judicial tip-taking cannot be cured by legislation.
The remedy against it lies in moral forces. It can be
restrained up to the level of local public sentiment but
no farther than that. The moral sense of the people
must be educated up to the perception and under-
standing of its corrupting influence, before anything
effectual can be done against it, and this tuition is
begun.
AGNOSTICISM VS. GNOSTICISM.
BY PAUL R. SHIPMAN.
In No. 94 of The Open Court as some of its
readers may remember, the Editor did me the honor
to publish an article of mine, entitled " Of Christianity,
and Agnosticism," and in the same number did me
the further honor of replying to the article. As his
reply, marked by characteristic ability, opens up his
case against agnosticism, I venture to improve the oc-
casion in a rejoinder.
"Every real existence," he declares, " lies within
the possible grasp of cognition." Lying within the
grasp of cognition implies not mere apprehension, but
comprehension. Nothing, then, is unknowable : every-
thing is knowable. This may be monism, as the
Editor styles it, but I should call it gnosticism, to
which at any rate it has a better title than either the
Hellenic or the Oriental system that bore the name
in the dawn of our era. I shall take the liberty of
calling it, with due respect, the New Gnosticism.
And certainly it could not have an abler or a more ac-
complished expositor than the Editor of The Open
Court. Let us compare this doctrine with agnosti-
cism.
There are, it may be well to mention, in the first
place, two kinds of knowledge—knowledge of the fact,
and knowledge of the fact and its causes. The former
knowledge, technically, is called historical, the latter
philosophical. The knowable is that which is capa-
ble of being known in its causes—the comprehensible.
The unknowable is that which not merely is known as
a fact only, but is incapable of being known other-
wise—known as existing, but not knowable in its na-
ture—the incomprehensible. * The recognition of
something which admits of this knowledge only is ag-
nosticism. The claim that every real existence lies
within the limits of the knowable is gnosticism. Ag-
nosticism denies that whatever is known historically
may be known philosophically. Gnosticism means, if
it means anything, that everything may be known
philosophically that is known at all. It it does not
mean this, it concedes the truth of agnosticism, and
means nothing. With this preliminary explanation,
we will proceed to try the issue between the two doc-
trines.
* *
I hold in my hand a pencil. In cognizing it,
what does cognition grasp ? Ultimately, the sensa-
tions it excites, with their relations: nothing else. But,
confessedly, sensation is one thing, and the real exist-
ence which produces it is a different thing. I say
confessedly, for the Editor, in one of those luminous
and delightful essays that make' up his book enti-
tled Fundamental Problems says: "Sensation and
the phenomena f of the outer world are different.
Sensations are not the real copies or images proper of
things. The nervous system is not actually a mir-
ror to reflect phenomena just as they are. Yet
we may justly compare it to a mirror. For after all,
certain features of the phenomena are preserved.
They are consequently not so entirely different as is
maintained. A certain form of phenomenon cor-
responds to a certain form of sensation." Granting
this, with the understanding that by phenomenon he
means the real existence which produces sensation, it
is none the less true that sensation and the real exist-
ence producing it are not the same thing, but different
things; for correspondence is not identity. The cor-
respondence, he confesses, is not so close as that be-
tween a copy and the original—not so close as that
between an object and its reflection in a mirror ; it is
really the correspondence between a sign and the
thing signified—between .v and the unknown quantity
it represents. Be this as it may, however, the two
are confessedly "different." In grasping sensation,
therefore, cognition does not grasp the real existence
producing it, which, accordingly, lies beyond the
grasp of cognition. In cognizing the pencil, cognition
grasps a form of matter ; but not the matter of the
form. This, cognition touches but cannot grasp.
The contents of mind, to generalize this view, are
resolvable, in the last analysis, into the sensation of
resistance, as the contents of the outer world are re-
solvable, in like manner, into that which causes this
* So far as I am aware, no agnostic has ever used the word itnfcnowablc in
any other sense than this.
t Phenomena he here confounds, under stress of theory, with the external
thing which Rives rise to sensation. Phenomena are subjective, not objective,
and result from sensation, instead of producing it.
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sensation. Here we have subject and object reduced
to their lowest terms :—on the one hand, the sensa-
tion of resistance, as the primordial element of intelli-
gence; on the other hand, the -external something
causing it, as the fundamental reality of nature. But
cognition reaches no further than the sensation. " The
primary condition of knowledge," the Editor admits,
"is sensation." How, then, can the fundamental re-
ality, which lies beyond sensation, lie within the grasp
of cognition ?
The existence of this external something is implied
in the sensation which the something excites, the two
being absolutely inseparable in consciousness, and
hence of equal validity ; but the nature of the some-
thing whose existence is thus guaranteed lies beyond
sensation, and consequently beyond cognition : it is
what constitutes the acknowledged difference between
sensation and the thing producing it. If sensation not
only limits knowledge, as the Editor confesses, but
differs from the thing which produces it, as he also
confesses, the difference, be it infinite or infinitesimal,
is necessarily unknowable ; knowledge, historical or
philosophical, cannot transcend its limits.
Whatever is knowable is knowable in conscious
ness only; but the external thing does not appear in
consciousness as it exists out of consciousness : it fol-
lows of necessity that the external thing, as it exists
out of consciousness, is at once real and unknowable
—
known only as a fact (historically), not knowable in its
causes (philosophically). And this is to say that every
real existence, instead of lying within the grasp of
cognition, stretches beyond it, disappearing behind
the veil of consciousness ; for, though consciousness
reveals all we know, it conceals more than it reveals,
like its emblem light, which, while unveiling the ter-
restrial landscape, veils the starry hosts. Night lifts
the veil of light, but what shall lift the veil of con-
sciousness?
" The subjective aspect of sensation, which we call
feeling, and the objective aspect of sensation, which is
a physiological phenomenon, and as such a process of
motion," he maj' repeat, as he avers in the essay to
which I have referred, "are actually one and the same
thing. The}' are two aspects only of one and the same
indivisible fact." In this case, the two are alike phe-
nomenal, and neither can be a real copy of the exter-
nal thing which gives rise to both ; consequently, the
argument remains undisturbed. In point of fact, the
combination of molecular motions, whatever that par-
ticular combination may be, from which sensation im-
mediately rises, is not an aspect of sensation, but the
proximate cause of it—the last link in the chain of causa-
tion which connects the external thing with conscious-
ness; but a cause and its effect are not "one and the
same thing. " Besides, an aspect is the appearance of a
thing from a certain point of view, the different aspects
of the thing being its different appearances from dif-
ferent points; but points of view do not affect the con-
stitution of a thing. An indivisible fact which is mo-
tion without feeling from one point of view, and feel-
ing without motion* from another, is no fact at all,
but simply a logical illusion. An indivisible fact di-
visible into motion and feeling is the most arrant of
self-contradictions.
Here I might safely close my rejoinder, if I were
addressing the Editor alone, for a trained logician,
like a trained soldier, knows when the battle is lost
or won, and rules himself by the knowledge; but in
addressing the Presiding Judge of The Open Court, it
should be remembered, one addresses the jury im-
panelled by that tribunal, and a jury, to be quite
satisfied, needs in general to see the outworks as well
as the citadel of a case lying in ruins before them. On
this account chiefly it may be worth while to examine
the case against agnosticism a little in detail, picking
up the details here and there, as one may find them
scattered throughout the Editor's extremely able
though somewhat desultory discussions.
" Existence and its manifestation are not two
different things," he says; "both are one." He adds,
as if by way of paraphrase : "Existence and knowabil-
ity are identical," and, again, "Existence, reality, and
cognizability are synonymous terms." If existence
and the manifestation of existence are one, what be-
comes of his admission that sensation and the outer
existence which occasions it are "different"—that
"sensations are not the real copies or images proper
of things"? If existence, and its manifestation through
sensation, are "different," they cannot be "one"—if
the manifestation is not so much as a real copy of the
thing, much less is it the thing itself.
The manifestation of existence, let it be noted, is
subjective—within consciousness ; the existence man-
ifested is objective—beyond consciousness ; and the
former is so different from the latter as not to be a real
copy of it
;
yet the two, asserts the philosopher who
acknowledges all this, are one. If so, the same thing
at the same time not only is both in consciousness and
out of consciousness, but differs from its own individ-
uality in such wise that it is not a decent counterfeit of
itself.
This is not all. The manifestation of existence, in
kind and degree, depends on the kind and degree of
the organization in which it takes place, the higher
the organization is the greater being the manifestation
or susceptibility of manifestation. Inasmuch, how-
ever, as man stands at the head of organized beings,
having consequently the greatest susceptibility of man-
ifestation, it is a logical necessity that in the case at
* The Editor e.tpressly refers to " eeling " as " being no motion."
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least of every class of beings inferior to him the man-
ifestation of existence should fall short of existence,
and, moreover, that in each of these classes the excess
of existence should be unknowable to the members of
the class, the excess standing out of relation to the
constitution of their powers, and of course beyond
their grasp. Existence necessarily exceeds its manifes-
tation or capability of manifestation, therefore, in every
grade of being from the moner up to man ; whose pre-
rogative it is to feel the excess of existence which even
he cannot grasp, his higher consciousness catching,
first of all in the mounting scale of life, a faint yet in-
dubitable glimpse of the Overlife, as the loftiest peak
of earth is the first to glow in the light of morning.
Nor is this all. According to the law of the con-
servation of energy, existence is indestructible ; but, if
existence and its manifestation are one, either exist-
ence is destructible or its manifestation is indestruc-
tible, consequences both of which are absurd, but of
which one or the other is inevitable. Take, for ex-
ample, if any is needed, the familiar case of allotro-
pism. When the existence manifested in the form of a
diamond passes into the form of charcoal, what be-
comes of the diamond? It must survive or perish. If
it survives, the existence of which it is a manifestation
must be in two different states at the same time : if it
perishes, as it does, it is not one with the existence of
which it was a manifestation, for that is imperishable.
No : the manifestation of existence, and the exist-
ence manifested, are two things ; and it is impossible
to make out of them only one. The identity of exist-
ence and its manifestation implies either a manifesta-
tion that does not manifest or an existence that does
not exist. The manifestation of existence is a transi-
tory form symbolized in consciousness* ; existence is
the indestructible force which constitutes the subject
of the form: forms may come and forms may go, but
force abides forever. Only forms are knowable ; that
of which they are forms, lying outside of consciousness
though against it, is unknowable.
"Existence and knowability are identical," we are
told. Knowability by whom—man or moner ? If
moner, the assumption, as we have seen, is prepos-
terously false. If man, what is the warrant for assum-
ing that his knowing power, more than that of the
moner or of any intermediate class of organisms, is
capable of exhausting existence ? Warrant there is
none ; but there is warrant, complete and authentic,
for asserting the reality of something that goes beyond
the utmost reach of his power—something that although
* Manifestation supposes not only sometbing manifested but somebody to
whom it is manifested. Existence out of relation with sentiency is not man-
ifested. " A pebble on the surface of the moon " exists, and is manifestable,
but not manifested. To say the pebble manifests itself to the moon, and the
moon to the pebble, is an impropriety of speech, putting it mildly. If man-
ifestation means no more than contact, philosophy, I submit, has no use for
the word. But in no conceivable meaning is it identical with existence.
ever in view he can never seize—something that, when
his striving faculties sink at length in utter exhaustion,
passes freshly by. And this warrant is found, in its
most authoritative form, in this very strain and col-
lapse of his faculties ; which, by showing that the
negation of the assertion is absolutely inconceiv-
able, establishes the certainty of the assertion. The
warrant, indeed, is given in the primordial element of
intelligence, and renewed in every act of conscious-
ness, from birth to death. It is recorded legibly in the
abstract of our cognitions—wrought in living letters in
the web of mind. In short, the reality of the unknow-
able, is not only certified by reason, but attested by
consciousness : its voucher is signed by common sense
and countersigned by philosophic sense. Not by any
means, observe, that it is a determinate object of
thought, but is cogitated, on the contrary, to use the
words of Kant, " merely as an unknown something " ;
it is strictly not an object, but rather a fleeting revela-
tion of what to us is "the void and formless infinite "
from which objects are "won"—the whiff and wind,
if one may so express it, of the transcendent reality
that passes us in every moment of our conscious life.
Of all the contents of mind it is the vaguest and most
subtile, and yet the simplest, for in the crucible of
analysis all things else dissolve into it. If the unknow-
able is not real nothing is real.
* *
"If we take away from a thing," the Editor says,
"all the properties that we are accustomed to com-
prehend by a word, there is left the meaningless word,
a mere sound, the bare string with which the bundle
was tied together." What has befallen the thing? Is
not that left ? A mental act can hardly wipe out a ma-
terial thing. Or does the thing consist in the sensa-
tions it excites, being constituted by its own conse-
quences, which it produces before it exists? So much
indeed would be required by the identity of existence
and its manifestation. The properties of a thing, as
we know them, are nothing more than the sensations
it occasions in us, and, do or imagine what we may in
regard to these, the thing itself remains intact—exter-
nal to us, independent of us, unknowable bj' us; for,
as sensations are different from the thing which occa-
sions them, and the properties of a thing are the sen-
sations which it occasions, the properties of a thing
are necessarily different from the thing, the difference,
whatever the existence that measures it, lying beyond
sensation, and thus beyond the bounds of knowledge.
Abstracting the properties of the thing is merely con-
templating separately the transient effects of a transi-
tory form of an indestructible force ; abstraction cannot
do away with one jot or tittle of this force. The thing
in its inexhaustible reality, conjure as we please what
we call its properties, is left untouched. Mentally
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withdrawing its properties no more exhausts it than
shutting one's eyes extinguishes the sun.
"Truth," says the Editor, "being a relation be-
tween subject and object, appears to be relative in its
nature." This mild and somewhat halting statement
of the relativity of knowledge answers happily to a
conception of the relative from which the absolute is
supposed to be excluded. "Absolute existence (in
fact everything absolute) is impossible," he says.
Then how do we arrive at a conception of the relative ?
A conception of the relative exclusive of the absolute
is contrary to reason ; for the relative suggests the ab-
solute as its correlative, apart from which the relative
itself is inconceivable, the consciousness of a relation
implying a consciousness of both terms of the relation.
A conception of the relative without reference to the
absolute is as impossible as a conception of the cause
without reference to the effect, or of the father without
reference to the child. If we take away from the rel-
ative its relation to the absolute the relative itself turns
absolute. Hence, a consciousness of the absolute, in-
definite yet positive, is necessitated by the conditions
of the thinkable. So far from being impossible, as the
Editor thinks, it is necessary. For that matter, what
is the All, on the conception of which his philosophy
is founded, but the absolute ? The All is conditioned
by nothing, for it contains everything ; and the un-
conditioned is the absolute. If the All is not absolute,
it is relative ; but, if relative, it is not self-dependent,
but depends on something outside of itself, in which
case it is not the All, but a part of the All. His posi-
tion logically engages him to shift the centre of things,
and keep on shifting it, indefinitely. Archimedes, with
a natural pride in his demonstration of the principle of
the lever, boasted that if he had a place to stand on
he could move the earth wherever he pleased ; but the
Editor of The Open Court undertakes, standing on
nothing, to pry the universe from its poise, and to-
gether with it "spin forever down the ringing grooves
of change." Even so he could not escape the abso-
lute, which at every pause would confront him anew.
He could more easily walk away from his shadow than
think away from the absolute.
" The question itself, as to the cause of existence
in general," he says, "is not admissible, for the law
of causation is applicable to all phenomena of nature,
but not to the existence of nature, which must be ac-
cepted as a fact." True : yet what is this but saying
that " existence in general " is larger than the forms of
the knowable—that it transcends them—that it stands
beyond them, and independently of them—and by
consequence is unknowable? Why is the question
not admissible ? Because, as he owns, it is one of
those questions "which by their very nature admit of
no answer." Why does it admit of no answer? Be-
cause the subject of it is unknowable. No other suf-
ficient reason can be assigned. If the subject were
knowable, the question self-evidently would admit of
an answer. If the subject were nothing, the allega-
tion of that fact would itself be an all-sufficient
answer. But he avows that the question admits of no
answer. "The question itself is not admissible," he
says. And he is right. The something not ourselves
that weaves ourselves is unknowable ; and to ask its
cause is to assume that the unknowable is knowable.
The question cannot be put without defying a funda-
mental law of thought ; the fortnulation of it is treason
to the majesty of reason. No question could be less
admissible. But what subject could be less know-
able ? And what remains of his case against agnosti-
cism ? He has surrendered it.
THE LIMITATIONS OF OUR SENSES.
One of the strongest arguments in favor of agnosti-
cism is based upon the same principle as that upon
which positivism stands. We recognize that the ulti-
mate data of experience and the basis of all knowl-
edge are sensations. ' Sensations naturally depend
upon the character of the senses ; and the senses of
man—indeed those of every possible living being—are
adapted according to circumstances to special sensa-
tions only. "Now it is evident," the agnostic de-
clares, "that our knowledge is limited to those natu-
ral processes which can affect our senses
;
yet it
is precluded from all the rest. That which cannot af-
fect our senses will forever remain unknown to us.
It is unknowable. "
The fallacy of this syllogism is apparent and can
be pointed out by the mere statement of innumerable
discoveries concerning such natural processes as do
not affect our senses. The truth is that man's knowl-
edge is not at all limited to his own direct sensations.
By the power of his mind through reflection he can,
and he constantly does, transcend that narrow sphere,
and he gathers new material for his experience through
indirect observations.
The senses are affected indirectly, if a thing is per-
ceived by its effects upon other things. We lack for
instance an organ to perceive the chemical rays of
light. They have no perceptible effect upon our eye.
Nevertheless we can indirectly be affected by them
when we observe their effects upon the photographer's
sensitive plate. Thus we bring a process that does
not affect our senses within their range through
indirect observation.
There are innumerable examples of a similar kind,
and the assertion that a certain thing, this or that nat-
ural phenomenon, is unknowable has by the progress
of science again and again been refuted.
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Let me cite one instance only from the later his-
tory of science. Auguste Comte who, under the
inappropriate name of positivism, some time before
the invention of the word agnosticism, propounded
and defended the agnostic idea of the Unknowable,
declared that certain things must necessarily remain
forever hidden from the knowledge of man, and he
selected as an illustration that we could never know the
chemical composition of the stars. Comte's assertion
appeared very plausible ; the limitation of our knowl-
edge in that line seemed to be beyond the shadow of
a doubt. For there is no possibility of a chemist's
ever getting a piece of, or taking a trip to, Sirius or to
any other one of the stars. And yet such is the
interconnection of all processes in the universe, that
means were discovered to state most positively of
what materials the stars consist. It was a straiige
irony of fate that while Comte was publishing his as-
sertion of the agnostic view, two German scholars
were analyzing the rays of the sun and the stars by a
new method called spectral analysis, which in ex-
actitude rather surpasses the cruder method of an
analysis in the crucible. It is true that our chemists
cannot journey to the stars, but the light of the stars
travels to us and gives us information 'concerning the
substances of which they consist.
There is nothing in the world which does not pro-
duce some effect upon something. Imagine that a
certain something existed that did not in any way
whatever make its existence manifest—could it be
said to exist? I think not. The existence of a thing
and its manifestations are identical. The existence of
a thing, be it ever so insignificant, is real only by
manifesting its existence through certain effects. The
quality of producing effects is its realit)'.
We may fairly suppose that there are many things
in the world which have never as yet either directly
or indirectly affected us in a manner to make their
reality known to us. Yet all things in the world be-
ing interconnected, there is always the possibility that
their effects can somehow be brought to bear upon
our faculty of observation. Whatever exists is in so
far as it is real, knowable. There are certain things
which from a certain standpoint are unknowable, as
objects may from a certain point of view become in-
visible. A tree behind a house may be invisible to
to me but it is not invisible in itself. The Copernican
conception of the solar system may be incomprehensi-
ble to a savage, yet it is not incomprehensible per se.
Incomprehensibility is not a quality of things, not a
peculiar feature of all or of certain natural processes,
it does not attach to, it is not a quality of, the reality
of objects.
If things or natural processes appear to us as in-
comprehensible, the fault is not theirs but ours. If
the whole world is incomprehensible to us, it is no
proof that the world possesses the quality of being un-
knowable, but because we lack the quality of compre-
hending it; we ourselves in that case, are wanting in
strength to formulate a unitary conception of all the
natural phenomena which come within the reach
of our observation.
Sensations are the effects of surrounding objects
upon a sentient being. Sensations are the ultimate
basis of all knowledge ; they are the data of expe-
rience.
The duty of the scientist is to describe the facts of
natural processes in such a way as to show their reg-
ularity ; and the duty of the philosopher is to arrange
all knowledge into one harmonious sj^stem which shall
be a unitary conception of the world. Man must
have a conception of the world not only because it be-
hooves him as a thinking being to have such a con-
ception, and because the demands of his mind have to
be satisfied, but also because he is in want of a foun-
dation for his conduct in life. Brutes follow their im-
pulses, but man is—or ought to be—a moral being
;
he can regulate his actions according to certain max-
ims ; and the maxims of individuals as well as of
nations depend upon, they are derived from, their re-
spective conceptions of the world. The various phi-
losophies of all times and peoples find a practical ex-
pression in their ethics.
POSITIVE SCIENCE VERSUS GNOSTICISM AND
AGNOSTICISM.
IN ANSWER TO MR. SHIPMAN'S CRITICISM "AGNOSTICISM
VS. GNOSTICISM,
In a criticism of Fundamental Probleins Mr. Paul R. Shipman
presents the case of Agnosticism versus Positive Monism which
he calls Gnosticism, and submits it to the jury of The Open
Court. Often it seems as if a misconception in the usage of terms
on the one side or the other were the only obstacle to a concilia-
tion of both views. But then again such a radical difference ap-
pears in the principles from which the disputants se%'erally start,
that all mutual understanding at once vanishes.
Mr. Shipman 's versatility and logical acumen are well known ;
and the readers of Tlie Open Court, whether agnostic monists, or
positive monists, (for Mr. Shipman professes to be a Monist also,)
will watch with interest the vigorous onslaugh s he makes on our
position. We shall present the case of the defense in the following
separate articles :
I. GNOSTICISM AND AGNOSTICISM.
By Gnosticism (according to the etymology and the traditional
use of the word) I understand a philosophy that actually is, or at
least pretends to be, in possession of the truth. The gnostic
knows or pretends to know all. The position of The Open Court is
greatly different from that of gnosticism; itclaims, not that weknow
all things, but that things and their relations can be known ; nat-
ural processes can be investigated and the truth concerning them
ascertained. To call this theory Gnosticism is an honor which I
would rather decline.
Agnosticism maintains that things (or at least certain things)
cannot be known, not merely because the present state of human
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knowledge is insufficient, but because things in themselves are
unknowable.
Positive monism stands in opposition to both views. It pro-
tests against the self-assurance of the gnostic who proclaims with
regard to all problems his confident invenhnus, and it protests
against the diffidence of the agnostic whose constant refrain is the
desperate ipwriiliimiis. That principle is indeed true which Pro-
fessor Huxley declares to be "the essence of science whether
ancient or modern," and which he strangely identifies with agnos-
ticism, namely, " that a man shall not say he knows or believes that
which he has no scientific grounds for professing to know or be-
lieve" ; and taking my standpoint upon that very principle I reject
the tenels of agnosticism. There are no scientific grounds, norare
there in fact any philosophical grounds, for believing in such a
thing as the Unknowable.
II. COGNITION AND PHILOSOPHICAL KNOWLEDGE.
Cognition is defined in Fiiidaineiilal Pi-ohliniis as the systemati-
zation of experience, and the data of experience are sensations.
For instance, suppose I see for the first time in my lite a camel
:
then I am conscious of an unwonted sensation of sight. Let it
happen that after some time I see the camel again : then I recognize
the animal. The comparison made between the two sensations,
their identity being perceived, constitutes an act of cognition. An
instance like this is the simplest case imaginable. Bat all more
complicated cases of cognition are at bottom the same process.
When I recognize the circumstances under which the motion of
the moon around the earth is the same thing as the fall of a stone,
so that I am able to formulate the identity of these and all similar
cases in a statement called a natural law, I have accomplished an
act of cognition.
Cognition, therefore, does not go beyond sensations, and it
need not ; it simply arranges sensations until they are all systema-
tized into one great system.
Mr. Shipman calls "causes" what I should call reasons or
natural laws. By cause I understand that change which produces
another change. Causes, as I use the word cause, are facts no less
than are the effects of causes
;
yet a statement of the reasons, i.e.,
an explanation why these causes have such or such effects, is a
formulation of natural laws This Mr. Shipman calls philosoph-
ical knowledge.
Mr. Shipman says. " the recognition of something which ad-
mits of historical knowledge only," (i. e. , a knowledge of facts
which admits of no philosophical knowledge,) "is agnosticism."
Very well. But all facts admit of systematization, which is cog-
nition ; and for this reason we reject agnosticism. The ideal of
science is a unitary conception of all the data of experience as
one harmonious system—which would be the realization of mo-
nism.
III. SENSATIONS AND THINGS.
A sensation and the thing that causes the sensation are dif-
ferent. The sensation is an effect caused by the thing upon a liv-
ing sentient being. The sensation reproduces in its way the form
of the thing ; and certain feelings correspond to certain qualities of
the thing ; for instance, the sensation of redness to certain vibra-
tions of ether-waves. Thus, a sensation, or a sum of sensations,
represents the thing in the brain of a sentient being.
Mr. Shipman makes too much of my " confession " that things
and sensations are different. It stands to reason that all feelings
and all ideas are different from things. In elucidation, I here
reprint a few additional sentences of my " confession," which are
not quoted by Mr. Shipman. It is a passage written in answer to
M. Binet :
" A certain form of a phenomenon corresponds to a certain
form of sensation. The phenomena being different among them-
selves produce sensations that in their turn also are different among
themselves. And the difference suffices to distinguish them.
"The electric current in the wire of a telephone is entirely
different from the air- waves of sound. Nevertheless the form of
air-waves produced by spoken words can be translated, as it were,
into the electric current and from the electric current back again
into air-waves. Both can adapt themselves to the same form and
thus become messengers of information. Must we declare that all
communication through the telephone is impossible because elec-
tricity and sound-waves, wire and air, are entirely different ?"
IV. SENSATIONS AND KNOWLEDGE.
The difference between sensation and the thing that causes the
sensation, affords not the slightest reason why the thing should be
unknowable or why cognition should be impossible. To illustrate.
Knowledge is a representation of things and their relations, in the
mind of a thinking subject. The things need not actually enter
our brain in order to be represented in our mind. All things and
their relations being representable, they are knowable. A thing
and its image reflected in a glass are totally different, but this does
not make reflection— a representation in the mirror—impossible.
Sensation does not limit knowledge, as Mr. Shipman pre-
tends and as he erroneously declares that I have confessed. Sen-
sation is the basis of all knowledge. It is the building-material
employed in the structure of all cognition and of all philosophies
Abstract thoughts are derived from them. Even our dreams and
errors and illusions have their ultimate origin in sensations.
The most pregnant and concise answer to Mr. Shipman's
argument on the unknowability of things would perhaps be a para-
phrase of his own sentences, comparing the representation of
cognition to the images of things produced by reflection in a glass :
" Whatever can be mirrored," our paraphrase runs, " can be
mirrored in something like a glass only. But the external thing
does not appear in the glass as it exists outside of the glass. The
thing and the reflection of the thing are different. It follows of
necessity that the external thing, as it exists out of the glass is at
once real and unreflectible. The thing itself cannot be mirrored."
But why should the thing itself go into the glass ? Is it not
enough that it is mirrored in the glass ? Why should the thing itself
be grasped ? Why should the thing itself enter and appear bodily
in consciousness as it exists ? Is it not enough that it is repre-
sented in consciousness ? And being represented in conscious-
ness, that is knowledge ; being correctly and sufliciently repre-
sented, that is truth.
Mr. Shipman says, ' ' Consciousness reveals all we know, but
it conceals more than it reveals ; like its emblem light which while
unveiling the terrestrial landscape veils the starry hosts " This is
a very fine comparison but I do not see its application. The real
existence of things, Mr. Shipman says, disappears behind the veil
of consciousness. An exquisite simile ! But it proves to me
nothing. Whatever has affected consciousness as a sensation, is
represented therein. It is, in that case, thus far known (historical
knowledge) ; and the knowledge concerning the sensation will be
complete as soon as it is so arranged among all other sensations
and all the memories of other sensations that it fits into their sys-
tem without producing contradiction or discord (philosophical
knowledge).
The truth that external things remain outside the thinking
subject, that the things do not enter consciousness, although they
may be represented in consciousness is, it appears, the substance of
Mr. Shipman's proof of his doctrine that things are unknowable.
What does that prove but that Mr. Shipman's view of " knowing "
and " understanding " and " comprehending, " is totally different
from ours. In order to understand something we need not eat it,
so as to get the thing within us ; it is quite sufficient to have it
represented in our minds, for that is the nature of knowledge
—
that and nothing else.
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V. INDIVISIBLE FACTS.
A fact that is indivisible in reality can very well b3 divisible
in our mind. When we speak of the weight of a body we refer to
its weight and to that alone, not to its volume, not to other proper-
ties, not even to its mass. We designate thereby a certain property
of the body, viz., that a certain stress is exerted between it and the
centre of the earth. This property we separate in our minds from
all the other properties, although in reality they may be and to a
great e.xtent are inseparable. Weight for instance is quite insep-
erable from mass. Yet it is for certain purposes necessary to
make this distinction. If we speak of feeling, we make reference
to that subjective process only, and not to motion ; although in
reality feeling may be and, I believe it is, inseparably connected
with certain motions, with certain vibrations of nervous substance.
VI. WORDS.
By " manifestation " I understand the efficacy of natural pro-
cesses ; for manifestation means their becoming manifest, so as to
be palpable and observable. The word manifest is derived from
the Latin manus, hand, and fendere, to dash Against, Thus
it means palpable, perceivable ; and a manifestation is every act
of disclosi'ng— a display, a revelation. The manifestation of the
gravity of a stone is the fall of the stone or its pressure against the
object upon which it rests.
Mr. Shipman uses manifestation in a different, and a narrower,
sense. He understands by manifestation exclusively the manifes-
tation made upon a sentient being.
Whether Mr. Shipman's usage of the word or mine is more
justifiable, I do not care ; in writing I employ words as I expect
they will be understood. Should I find that a word is used more
commonly in a different sense than that in which I am accus-
tomed to use it, I should unhesitatingly give up my usage for
the benefit of others and, indeed, for my own benefit. For all
my desire in writing is, to make myself understood.
I do not propose to dwell at length upon such topics as the
proper philological meaning of this or that word
—
provided the
word in its context cannot be misunderstood. We therefore men-
tion only incidentally the declaration made in a foot-note by Mr.
Shipman where it is said : " Phenomena he here confounds, under
stress of theory, with the external thing which gives rise to sen-
sation, etc." Readers of my book will recognize the incorrectness
of this statement ; and I call Mr Shipman's attention to page 135
where the word phenomenon is explained. The passage quoted
from my book is a comment on a quotation from M. Binet, in which
I adopt his usage of the word in the sense of " natural process,"
which does not appear to me objectionable. There is nowhere in
Fundnvwntal ProbUms any confusion concerning the meaning of
this word and Mr. Shipman's charge is unjust.
Words must be construed according to their context. By ex-
istence we might now understand the abstract and empty idea of
existence and then again the concrete reality of existing things.
By matter we might now mean the abstract term comprehending
those qualities alone which are common to all substances, and
then again all the material qualities of a special piece of matter.
Every writer can expect that his readers will interpret words in
agreement with the connection in which they appear—the only
condition being that the author's meaning in each case be unmis-
takable. But ambiguity lurks in every expression separated from
its context.
VII. EXISTENCE AND ITS MANIFESTATION.
The "existence " of a thing is an abstract concept of greater
circumscription than is our idea of its special ' ' manifestation, " viz.
,
the form in which it appears at a given moment. That is all Mr.
Shipman can mean when he says : " Existence necessarily exceeds
its manifestation." However, existence cannot be said to exceed
"its capability of manifestation," as Mr, Shipman erroneously
adds.
Note here the danger of pictorial language ! " The excess of
existence " does not come within the range of sensation ; therefore
we are told, it is unknowable. This so called " excess of exist-
ence " is supposed to be something that exceeds or extends beyond
its present manifestation. Mr. Shipman says : " When the existence
manifested in the form of a diamond passes into the form of char-
coal, what becomes of the diamond ? It must survive or perish."
Manifestation therefore, he concludes is perishable, existence im-
perishable : existence and manifestation are different.
This is an example of treating abstract concepts as concrete
things. Is existence—that something "imperishable"—an es-
sence behind the diamond ? Is it at the same time diamond and
charcoal, or is it something unknowable that is neither ? In
either case it would certainly be as Mr. Shipman declares, incom-
prehensible.
Existence is not an "imperishable" essence aside from its
" perishable" manifestation. The abstract idea of existence is a
wider generalization than the concept of its special manifestation.
But the (omrcte existence of a given piece of reality is exactly iden-
tical with its present manifestation. That something " imperish-
able " of the diamond (which Mr. Shipman calls " existence") is
full and entire in the diamond and will be present in its entirety in
any other form into which the substance of the diamond may be
put. This special form we call a diamond ; in another form we call
it graphite or charcoal as the case might be.
That is the simple solution of this profound problem. There
is nothing mysterious in it, and I cannot detect a place upon
which agnosticism is to find a foothold.
VIII. RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
Mr Shipman asks : " Knowability by whom—manor moner ? "
If I declare that a problem is solvable, will you retort the same
question : by whom—man or moner ? And will you maintain that
because it is insolvable by the latter, it must be insolvable gener-
ally ? A mathematical problem is insolvable to a child ; it is
beyond the understanding of the cleverest dog, but it is therefore
not insolvable /t'rVc'. Many things, many explanations of natural
processes were unknowable to former generations
;
yet they were
not unknowable in themselves.
This is my whole objection to agnosticism : Unknoivnbility is
not a ijuality inhcient in things. Every thing that exists can
be represented in the consciousness of a sentient being. That
which is unknowable to me, is not unknowable to a man who has
the deeper insight to comprehend it I do not deny the relativity
of knowledge, I do not deny the inexhaustibility of existence for
cognition, nor do I deny that with the solution of every problem
new problems will constantly offer themselves Yet I do deny that
the Unknown is the Unknowable ; I do deny that legitimate prob-
lems exist which are insolvable.
IX. THE THING AND ITS PROPERTIES.
" If Vie take away from a thing all the prdperties that we are
accustomed to comprehend by a word, there is left " the meaning-
less word—a mere sound," Mr. Shipman asks, " What has be-
fallen the thing ? " Why, we have taken away the whole thing,
of course.
Mr. Shipman imagines that the thing would remain because
" a mental act can hardly wipe out a material thing." It seems as
if Mr. Shipman had overlooked the " if " or supposes that the prop-
erties are assumed to be taken away mentally, i. e., from the idea
of the thing only. Therefore the words //and thing are italicized
in the sentence above-quoted.
What I mean to say is that the thing is the sura total of all
its properties and that there is not " a thing in itself" behind its
THE OPEN COURT.
properties. The properties of a thing are its qualities. They are
not like the properties of a person in the sense of his possessions
and belongings, which if all were taken away, leave the person
still intact. All the properties of a thing, taken together, are the
thing. Accordingly, there are no such things as things in them-
selves.
Here appears again a difference in the usage of words Mr.
Shipman understands by " properties " of a thing " the sensations
which it occasions," while I would define " property " with Webster
as " that which is proper to any thing ; a peculiar quality of any
thing ; that which is inherent in a subject, or naturally essential
to it."
X. THE ABSOLUTE AND THE IMPOSSIBLE.
" The relative " and " the absolute " are expressions signify-
ing a certain attitude which we intend to take towards things. If I
wish to consider a thing not in the relations which in reality it
bears to other things, I consider it absolutely. Considering
things absolutely is a mental process, but in reality things never
possess any such absoluteness, they constantly remain in relations
to other things.
If there is anything absolute, it is the Universe or the All
;
reality considered in its totality is absolute. But here again, the
absoluteness of the All is an absoluteness in so far only as the All
has no relations to other Alls or Universes outside of it. Yet the
Universe has certain relations to its parts, as the solar system in
its totality comprises certain relations to its different planets.
Moreover, if the Universe, the sum total of all the celestial bodies,
may be considered as possessing one common motion, would
there not be a relation of the All to the direction of its own motion
—or to express it in popular terms, a relation between the All and
the empty space outside of it ? Are there not also relations of the
All as it is in this moment, to the All as it was and as it will be ?
If the agnostic assumes that there is something beyond
natural processes, to wit, his Unknowable, he can call absolute
neither Nature nor the Unknowable. Nature is not absolute, be-
cause the agnostic believes that it depends upon the unknowable
something- Mr. Shipman identifies the absolute with the Unknow-
able ; but the Unknowable has a sense and meaning only in so far
as it stands in a certain relation to nature. The absolutely absolute
then must be outside of the world of real and knowable existences,
it can only be a something that we need not care or bother about,
and we can safely disbelieve it without committing a sin or involv-
ing ourselves in a logical fallacy.
In popular parlance the word absolute is, and we deny not
that it may be, used in the sense of a relative co:npleteness, mean-
ing thereby that a thing has no relations in a certain direction
only. The theorems of mathematics are absolute in so far as their
authority is intrinsic, they are not laws proclaimed by some legis-
lative act. Yet they are not absolute in the sense that their validity
and certainty rest in midair or nowhere. They are not absolutely
absolute, but may very well be called absolute for the purpose of
declaring that in a certain way they are independent.
I repeat : an objectively and absolutely absolute does not exist.
" Absolute" expresses not a quality of or in things, but a certain
attitude of the thinking subject only. In reality there are no ab-
solute objects, no absolute things, no absolute relations.
Mr. Shiprnan reasons that ' ' the relative suggests the abso-
lute " as its correlative. But must it therefore, simply because it
is suggested, have a real existence ? I do not think so. So does
the possible suggest the impossible as its correlative. Is there-
fore the impossible a reality ? If it were, then indeed Mr. Ship-
man's argument that " we could more easily walk away from our
shadow than think away from the absolute " is no less true of the
impossible.
XI. THE INSOLVABLE PROBLEM.
Mr. Shipman uses to a great advantage my concession, as he
calls it, that there are problems which are insolvable. I declared
that such problems as are per sj insolvable are not admissible
;
they are illegitimate and wrongly stated. Mr. Shipman does not
accept this view of the subject but claims with great plausibility
that the mere existence of insolvable problems proves agnosticism.
Indeed, I might define agnosticism as that philosophy which looks
upon the basic problems of philosophy as insolvable.
It is true that I concede the existence of insolvable problems
;
but the existence of insolvable problems proves nothing in favor
of agnosticism. Let us see what an insolvable problem is.
Take as an instance the squaring of the circle. Thousands of
ingenious mathematical minds, Hindu sages, Greek philosophers,
and modern thinkers, have in vain attempted a solution. Grad-
ually certain mathematicians came to the conclusion that the prob-
lem might be insolvable, and recently Professor Lindemann, at
present of the University of Konigiberg, has taken the immense
trouble to demonstrate that the problem is insolvable and to ex-
plain TO/y it is insolvable. (See note on next page.) This settles
the question. The squaring of the circle being shown to be impos-
sible, the problem is solved. The solution is negative.
I might explain the nature of an insolvable problem by the
following example :
Problein : Take a rook, which can move in lines parallel to
the sides of the board only, and, starting from the corner square
Ai of a chess-board, pass through all the squares once, but never
more than once, and arrive at the corner of the board diagonally
opposite (square H, 8).ABCDEFGH
F G H
This problem is insolvable to the extent that the performance
demanded can never be accomplished. The problem, however,
is to this extent solvable that we can prove that whenever the num-
ber of squares in both directions make up an even number, the
demand is illegitimite. In reducing it to its simplest form, we may
state the same problem as follows : Take a board divided into
the four squares A, B, C, D, as the adjoined diagram shows.
Start with a rook from A, pass through B and
C only once, and arrive at D. This in other
words means : go to the left and at the same time to
the right, and arrive at a place midway between.
Or you might, demand this : Move in a cir-
cle and describe one complete revolution (only
one not one and a half) and arrive at the side op-
posite to that from which you started.
Problems that are wrongly stated must not be
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considered as lying beyond our comprehension. They are not
unknowable, not incomprehensible—they are illegitimate.
XII. THE AGNOSTIC'S PROBLEM.
Every rational thinker who, when working out a problem,
arrives at contradictory statements, would confess at once that he
must have made a mistake. The agnostic philosopher is an excep-
tion. He arrives at anon liquet, and it never occurring to him that
the confusion might be subjective, he declares that the confusion
is objective. Being taken to task, he makes the same mistakes
over again, arrives at the same contradictory statements, and
triumphantly proclaims his quod ernl liemons/nuuium !
The agnostic attitude changes the whole character of philos-
ophy. The philosopher's duty is to present a clear conception of
the world. The agnostic's problem is to prove that things are in
complete confusion. Happily it is not so. He can only prove the
confusion of his conception of things. P. c.
NB. Prof. Lindemann's essay appeared first in the Bcrlchte der Berliner
Akademie, (June 1S82,) then in the Comptcs rendus of the French Academy (Vol.
115, p. 72-74), and in the Mathematische Annalen (Vol. 20, p. 213-225). For a
popular discussion of the subject see Dr. Hermann Schubert, Die Quadratur
des Ziriels, published among the Wissenschaftliche Vortrage by R. Virchow
and Fr. v. HoltzendorSE, No. 67.
THE TALKING-WIRE.
BY LOUIS BELROSE, JR.
I slept and in my sleep there came to me
A perfect vision of my soul's desire :
Peace, born of Truth that lit the world like fire
And set all hearts aglow with sympathy.
And then there came a sound that seemed to be
The distant murmur of a golden lyre ;
I woke and near my window heard a wire
In low vibration turned to melody.
land of petty striving, loud with praise
Of heedless change and haste and wealth we store.
May softening time make music in your ways.
And school our young conceit to bow before
The simple dignity of older days
When things were less and man himself was more.
Washington, D. C, 1889.
CORRESPONDENCE.
TENURE OF LAND IN NEW ZEALAND.
To the Editor of The Open Court :—
Sir :
—
In your number 113, Azotes, it is announced that Wheel-
barrow has closed the debate re The Single Tax. I hope you will find
room for this letter, especially as I live in so far away a country as
New Zealand, and as I hope to interest your readers on the ' ' Land-
Question " as it is being administered in this country. About six
years ago the government adopted what we call the "perpetual
lease system," together with two other methods, " Freehold ten-
ure " and "the Homestead tenure." As in America, the govern-
ment acquired by various means, sometimes by confiscation, but
mostly by purchase, large tracts of land from the natives. These
lands have been dealt with from the earliest time by different
methods. A large portion has been set out for various purposes in
the shape of endowments, and the remainder dealt with as before
mentioned.
1 am not going to attempt to answer " Wheelbarrow " or his
critics or say which of them has the best of the arguments re The
Single Tax, but will state some facts. Last year out of a total area
of land disposed of by the government, consisting of 200,000 acres,
170,000 acres was let under the "perpetual lease." The conditions
are that the tenant shall pay to the State five per cent, on the
capital value of the land so taken up, and the terra of lease 25
years. At the end of that period a revaluation shall take place on
the value. All improveihents belong to the tenant, who has the
first offer of releasing for another term. If he refuses the fresh
valuation, it passes to the one who will buy.
With the consent of the State the tenant may sell out at any
time. The land never passes out of the " hands " of the State.
Thus you see we, or our children rather, will participate in a large
State domain eventually. A man with a small capital has no
need to lay out all his money on the purchase, but can immedi-
ately start to work. Purchasing the freehold acts as a deterrent.
Freehold tenure is undoubtedly the best if—mark //—he can re-
tain the freehold. I djn't know how it is irr .America, but here
in these colonies the law allows any one to mortgage their free-
holds. Now a good stiff mortgage generally knocks all the senti-
ment off a freehold, in fact it is no longer free, but bond, hold.
Under our perpetual lease the government will not allow, nor will
any one advance a dollar on what there is no security to offer.
Ample security of tenure is what I conceive to be all that is re-
quired, and I would advocate that all tenants should by law be
remunerated for all improvements they may make on leasehold
property, subject to certain provisions for the security of the
landlord, be it individual or State.
The real evil attending land tenure, is the gambling element
;
if we can prevent that we shall have solved the problem.
Yours truly,
GiSBORNE, New Zealand. W. L. File.
NOTES.
We have upon our table the following Pamphlets, Reports
of Proceedings, and Broschures : " Israelite and Indian, A Par-
allel in Planes of Culture," by Col Garrick Mallery (New York,
Appleton & Co.); " Proceedings of the Thirty- Seventh Annual
Meeting of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin'" (Madison,
Wisconsin) ; " The Control and Care of Pauper Inebriates of
Towns and Cities," by Lewis D Mason, M. D. (Fort Hamilton,
N. Y.); " The Voice of Labor," by David Overmyer (Lucifer Pub-
lishing House, Valley Falls, Kansas); "The Kansas Fight for
Free Press," (Lucifer Publishing Company, Valley Falls, Kan-
sas); "Natural Rights, Natural Liberty, and Natural Law," by
Frank Q. Stuart (Denver, Colorado); "Eleventh Annual Report
of the State Board of Health of the State of Rhode Island";
"Eighth Inaugural .Address of Clark Bell, Esq.," as President of
the Medico-Legal Society of New York ; " Ninth Inaugural Ad-
dress of Clark Bell, Esq " ; " Monomania," by Clark Bell, Esq.;
" Suicide and Legislation," by Clark Bell, Esq.; " The Responsi-
bilities and Duties of the Medical Profession Regarding Alcoholic
and Opium Inebriety," an address by C. W. Earle ; "Observa-
tions in Chiara's Clinic and the Hospital St Maria Nuova, Flor-
ence, Italy," by C. W. Earle, M. D. (Chicago); " Observations in
Vienna," by C W. Earle, M. D.; "Infant Feeding," by C. W.
Earle, M. D.; " The Influence of Sewerage and Water Pollution
on the Prevalence and Severity of Diphtheria," by Charles War-
rington Earle, M. D. (Chicago); "Social Ethics," by Ezra H.
Heywood ; " A Christian Science Sermon on the Nonentity of a
Personal Devil," by Joseph Adams; "Will Shakespeare, Tom
Paine, Bob Ingersoll, and Charley Bradlaugh" (London, R.
Forder, 28 Stonecutter Street, E. C.) "Report of the Depart-
ment of Health of the City of Chicago, for 1888," from Commis-
sioner Oscar De Wolf, M. D.
Dr. Paul Cams will deliver a lecture in Milwaukee on Sunday
morning, March 2d, before the Freie Gemeinde. The subject will
be Tod und Unsterblichkeit (Death and Immortality).
